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Abstract
How do the effects of financial constraints on innovation performance vary by sector
and firm characteristics? This paper uses innovation survey data from eleven European
countries to examine the heterogeneity of these effects. So far, there has been a lack of
cross-country micro-level studies exploring the effects of financial constraints on innova-
tion performance in Western Europe and only little research about the variability of such
effects between the broad sectors of production and services. Our results suggest that the
impact of direct measures of financial barriers differs in production and services sectors,
and also by the firm’s export orientation. In particular, financial constraints appear to
have more pronounced negative effects in the production sector than in the services sector.
Among different types of firms, the response to financial constraints seems to be stronger
for non-exporters.
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1 Introduction
There is ample evidence in the economics literature that achieving sustained long-term pro-
ductivity and economic growth is intrinsically linked to research and development (R&D) and
innovation investment (Coe & Helpman, 1995; Cainelli et al., 2006; Coe et al., 2009). Due to
informational asymmetries with external investors and uncertain and lagged returns, this type
of investment is considered to be particulary sensitive to financial constraints (Himmelberg &
Petersen, 1994; Hall, 2002). The available empirical evidence, however, is not as conclusive as
one might expect. Some studies provide evidence that financial frictions have a strong neg-
ative effect upon innovation (Mulkay et al., 2000; Aghion et al., 2008; Ouyang, 2011), while
some others find the opposite effect (Harhoff, 1998; Bond et al., 2005). A common feature
of earlier studies on this topic, particulary of those that show a positive relationship between
financial constraints and various innovation indicators, is that they measure the former using
the sensitivity of investments to internally generated cash flows. Kaplan & Zingales (1997),
and more recently Campello et al. (2010), argue in favour of a direct survey-based measure
of financial constraints, demonstrating that traditional cash-flow indicators fail to identify
meaningful patterns in the data; for example, because of positive correlation with expected
profits. Another problem associated with the study of obstacles to innovation is the presence
of bias arising from the endogeneity of the financial constraints variable and survey sampling
issues. Recent papers that use direct indicators based on firm’s own assessments and address
such econometric problems (see Savignac, 2008; Gorodnichenko & Schnitzer, 2012; Hottenrott
& Peters, 2012) point to significant negative effects of financial barriers on the propensity of
firms to engage in innovation1.
Although the aforementioned literature has provided important insights, the tests im-
plemented consider mainly one country or a group of countries with similar characteristics
and involve a relatively small number of firms2. The shortage of systematic studies based
on cross-country data renders it difficult to conclude that the reported effects are a univer-
sal phenomenon. In addition, many existing studies on this topic focus on exploring the
causal effect of financial constraints on R&D investment. For example, Brown et al. (2012)
find strong evidence that financing constraints drive R&D below the socially optimal levels.
While R&D has strengths as a measure of innovation, it is an input (not the output) in the
innovation process, and as suggested by (Griffith et al., 2006), it does not take account of
the productivity or the effectiveness of effort. Furthermore, public R&D and public financial
support at different stages of the innovation process may sometimes even replace the firm’s
own R&D investment (David et al., 2000; Clausen, 2009). Therefore, considering the effects
on direct measures of innovation output can complement the findings of these studies and
contribute to a better assessment of the overall impact of financing difficulties on innovation
performance. Finally, the existing literature tells us little about the cross-sectoral variability
of such effects. Since the level of firms’ financial distress is heterogeneous across different
sectors (Silva & Carreira, 2010), an accurate analysis of the impact of financial barriers on
innovation performance should also take into account the considerable differences between
the aggregate production and services sectors. The presence of distinct sectoral differences in
the response to financial constraints takes on particular importance in the European context,
where the share of manufacturing in employment and value added has decreased over the past
decades and economies have shifted towards services (Brandes, 2008). Moreover, an enquiry
1See Czarnitzki & Hottenrott (2010) for an overview of the empirical literature.
2A negative relation between financial constraints and innovation has been shown, for example, in French
manufacturing firms (Savignac, 2008), in German manufacturing firms (Hottenrott & Peters, 2012), in Por-
tuguese firms (Silva & Carreira, 2012), and in a panel of transition economies (Ma¨nnasoo & Meriku¨ll, 2011;
Gorodnichenko & Schnitzer, 2012).
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in this direction sheds light on the channels through which better access to external finance
can foster innovation activity and lead to higher productivity and economic growth.
The present article addresses these issues using European-comparable firm-level data from
the Community Innovation Surveys (CIS). In particular, it contributes to the literature in
two main aspects. First, we explore the relationship between direct measures of financial con-
straints and innovation performance using data from a large number of firms in both Western
and Eastern European countries. Second, we examine whether these effects depend on firm
characteristics and vary between the broad sectors of production and services. To avoid the
spurious positive correlation due to firms not wishing to innovate (and thus without financial
obstacles to innovation), we restrict the sample to include only the potentially innovative
firms3 (to be referred to as “innovative firms” from now on) and consider the effects on the
propensity to have high innovation performance (high share in sales of innovative products4)
rather than the propensity to engage in innovation activities. In addition, we tackle the
endogeneity problem by estimating the probability of having high innovation performance
and the likelihood to face financial constraints simultaneously using recursive-mixed-process
estimators (Roodman, 2009).
Two basic results emerge from our empirical analysis. First, the lack of appropriate sources
of finance is an important hampering factor to innovation performance across European coun-
tries. Specifically, the existence of financial constraints reduces the likelihood to have high
innovation performance by 15-20%. These effects do not seem to be driven by the inclusion
of Eastern European countries in our sample nor to be sensitive to the definition used for
the outcome variable. Second, the role of financial constraints appears to be stronger and
statistically more robust among innovative firms in the production sector than in the services
sector. Within industries and especially within the production sector, innovative firms that
do not engage in exporting activities appear to experience the greatest problems.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical background and the
related empirical literature on the relationship between financial constraints and innovation;
Section 3 describes the data used; Section 4 outlines the empirical model specification and the
econometric techniques applied; Sections 5 and 6 report the estimation results and investigate
their robustness; Section 7 concludes and discusses the policy implications.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Theoretical predictions
In their seminal paper, Modigliani & Miller (1958) state that in perfect capital markets charac-
terized by no taxes, no bankruptcy costs and no asymmetric information, investment decisions
are indifferent to capital structure. However, since such conditions do not generally hold and
information asymmetries influence lending and investment decisions, the costs of different
kinds of capital may vary by type of investment (Meyer & Kuh, 1957; Leland & Pyle, 1977;
Myers & Majluf, 1984). Investment in R&D and other innovation inputs, compared to phys-
ical assets, is likely to be more affected by financial factors (Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994;
Hall, 2002; Hall & Lerner, 2010) because it requires large sunk costs (Alderson & Betker, 1996)
and produces intangible assets that can be difficult to use as collateral for external borrowing
(Williamson, 1988; Alderson & Betker, 1996). Furthermore, investment in innovation projects
3Following Savignac (2008), potentially innovative firms are the firms that wish to innovate. Specifically,
the corresponding sample includes: (i) the firms that report product (good or service) or process innovation,
(ii) the firms that report ongoing or abandoned innovation activities, or (iii) the firms that report obstacles
to innovation. The excluded firms are those that are not interested in innovation; that is, the non-innovative
firms and those that do not report obstacles on innovation.
4Mohnen & Ro¨ller (2005) refer to this variable as the “intensity of innovation”.
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is characterized by high degree of information asymmetries that drive the investors or lenders
to ask for a higher rate of return than in the case of investments in physical assets. As stressed
by Myers & Majluf (1984), although information asymmetries matter for external financing
of all types of investments, they are particularly significant in limiting financing of innovation
investments due to the complexity and specificity of the innovation process.
In a standard Dixit-Stiglitz type monopolistic competition framework, financial constraints
have been shown to have an adverse effect on the incentive to innovate, as they lower the
difference between the firm’s post- and pre-innovation profits. Gorodnichenko & Schnitzer
(2012), for instance, develop a stylized model that highlights the interaction between financial
constraints and innovation activities and produces two clear, testable predictions. First, the
stronger the internal financial constraints (due to a negative liquidity shock), the lower is
the investment in innovation or knowledge creation activities in general. Second, the more
severe the external financial constraints (that is, the larger the cost of external finance), the
more pronounced is the impact of a negative liquidity shock on innovation. In other words,
although firms tend to use internal funds to finance innovation projects (Hottenrott & Peters,
2012), the cost of external finance may also play a role for the innovation incentive, since it
can affect the firms’s production cost and overall profitability.
2.2 Explaining variation across firm-groups and industries
To the extent that firms can be classified into groups with low and high financial costs, the
importance of financial factors in constraining innovation activity may vary according to firm-
level characteristics. An obvious consideration is that bigger companies are less restricted than
smaller firms (see Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Gorodnichenko & Schnitzer, 2012). This may
reflect that large companies have more resources to innovate and can benefit from economics
of scale in R&D and marketing. Specifically, it may be more difficult for small firms, than
for larger firms, to either raise outside finance (due to more severe problems of information
asymmetries) or provide internally generated funds for the financing of an innovation project
of a given size. In addition, for smaller newer firms there may be no track record to base a case
for funding and there may be fewer realisable assets to use as collateral (Canepa & Stoneman,
2003, 2008). Another possible distinction is between firms that engage in exporting activities
and those that do not. It is well known that exporters tend to be larger and more well-known,
and thus, they may enjoy better relations with external investors or lenders. Also, exporters
need to have relatively high productivity levels to be able to cover the substantial sunk costs
of exporting (Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al., 2004; Wagner, 2007). Finally, firms that belong
to an enterprise group may be less financially constrained than firms that do not, since they
have better access to internal funds and can rely more upon bank credit given their relatively
lower default risk.
Differences with respect to sector-level characteristics may also exist, even though the
relevant theoretical predictions are not clear-cut. Dahlstrand & Cetindamar (2000), for in-
stance, point out that firms in services industries are more capable of self-financing and of
using fewer bank loans than those in production industries. This might be driven by the fact
that services firms, on average, require a lower initial investment (lower sunk costs) and have
to attain a lower minimum efficient scale than production firms (Silva & Carreira, 2010). In
addition, innovation in services industries may require less external financing than in produc-
tion industries as the latter is more dependent on large scale and costly R&D labs (Gallouj
& Weinstein, 1997). On the other hand, firms in the services sector tend to be smaller and
less physical-assets intensive, and hence, as already mentioned, they cannot provide as much
collateral for external borrowing5.
5Debt holders such as banks prefer physical and redeployable assets as security for their loans since they
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Empirical studies that that look into such variations include Ughetto (2008) and Hotten-
rott & Peters (2012) who show that external financial constraints are more binding for R&D
and innovation of small firms. Likewise, Scellato (2007), using dynamic panel data analysis,
finds that financing barriers affect more strongly the patenting activities of small enterprises.
Canepa & Stoneman (2003) provide evidence that higher-risk, newer and less profitable indus-
tries are more likely to experience financial constraints in their innovation activities, whereas
Gorodnichenko & Schnitzer (2012), find that these impacts are more pronounced in domestic-
owned firms (compared to multinationals) and in firms that operate in services industries6.
Although this recent empirical research points to certain directions, further work along these
lines (that considers cross-country data, employs alternative innovation measures and puts
more emphasis on sectoral-level differences) is needed. The present article seeks to do this.
3 Data
We employ cross-country micro-level data from the fourth Community Innovation Survey
(CIS4) which covers the period 2002 to 2004. This survey is executed by national statistical
offices throughout the European Union (EU) and in Norway and Iceland according to the
EU-wide definitions of the Oslo Manual. The countries considered in our study are: Bul-
garia, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain,
Sweden. The rationale for the choice of these eleven countries is twofold: first, they all have
information on the dependent and key explanatory variables used in our empirical model;
second, they report a sufficiently large number of innovative firms and provide data for firms
in both production and services sectors. Unfortunately, for three large countries (namely,
France, Italy and Spain) the information required to carry out the same empirical analysis
using data from the next CIS wave (CIS2006 with observation period 2004 to 2006) is not
available7. Hence, while we use CIS2006 data for robustness checks, our analysis relies pri-
marily on CIS4 for which the sample size is very large and enables a more detailed firm-level
and industry-level comparison. Due to the confidential character of the CIS micro-data, our
empirical investigation has been carried out in the SAFE Center at the premises of Eurostat
in Luxembourg (in accordance with the confidentiality requirements of Eurostat). In this way,
we also avoid the possibility of micro-aggregation bias associated with the use of the publicly
available micro-aggregated CIS data (Mohnen & Ro¨ller, 2005).
The CIS has a number of advantages relative to data sets employed in previous studies.
First, it provides direct self-reported measures of firms’ financial constraints and innovation,
and thus, we do not need to rely on indirect proxies. Second, it is the only data source that
contains cross-country information on innovation activities in Western European countries.
Third, it is based on a common survey questionnaire and methodology and includes data on
a large number of firms and a broad range of industries, which makes the corresponding data
set suitable for cross-industry and cross-country comparison. Fourth, it entails information
on both internal and external financial constraints, which allows us to identify the channels
through which financing barriers may affect innovation. In order to construct instrumental
variables for our measures of financial constraints, we also employ data from Amadeus: a
comprehensive database containing comparable financial information for millions of compa-
nies across Europe. Our CIS4-based sample, which results from merging these two sources,
can be liquidated in case of project failure or bankruptcy (Hottenrott & Peters, 2012).
6It must be stressed that Gorodnichenko & Schnitzer (2012) use data from emerging market economies in
Central and Eastern Europe, where the services sector has been underdeveloped.
7The CIS2008 (with observation period 2006 to 2008) is also not considered here as the CIS2008 questionnaire
does not include questions on factors hampering innovation activities. This is a result of the decision to only
ask some questions (for which responses change slowly over time) every four years instead of every two years.
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contains about 40,000 innovative firms, out of which about 29,500 are from Western countries
(see Table A.1).
4 Empirical Strategy
One distinctive characteristic of the CIS questionnaire is that it begins by asking all firms for
some general information and whether they have innovation activities (completed, ongoing,
or abandoned) or face any obstacles to innovation. Then, only the firms that provide positive
responses to these questions (that is, the firms that wish to innovate) are requested to answer
a large number of additional questions, such as those on public financial support, informa-
tion sources and cooperation. In the last part of the questionnaire, all surveyed firms are
asked about financial and non-financial constraints to innovation. As pointed out by Savignac
(2008), questioning the firms that do not wish to innovate, and hence do not meet any finan-
cial constraints, about such constraints may lead to a positive correlation between the two
variables. To avoid this problem, we restrict the sample to include only the firms that wish to
innovate and consider the impact of financial constraints on relative innovation performance
rather than the propensity to innovate8. This is similar to the approach followed by Brown
et al. (2012), who concentrate their analysis on R&D reporting firms.
As already stated, another econometric problem associated with the study of obstacles
to innovation is the endogeneity of the financial constraints variable. This endogeneity may
arise because both financial constraints and innovation patterns may be affected by common
elements of unobservable heterogeneity; for example, by firm-specific risk factors, such as
the uncertainty associated with the output of an innovation project, or the lack of informa-
tion about the time needed to bring an innovation project onto the market (Savignac, 2008;
Ma¨nnasoo & Meriku¨ll, 2011). To address this problem, we estimate the probability of having
high innovation performance and the likelihood to face financial constraints simultaneously
using a two-equation system as follows:
‘Innovation Success’insc = Φ{α‘Financial Constraints’insc + βXinsc + λn + ηs + ψc + ε1} (1)
‘Financial Constraints’insc = Φ{γYsc + µn + ε2} (2)
(
ε1
ε2
)
∼ N
{(
0
0
)
,
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
]}
where ‘Innovation Success’ is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s turnover from
newly introduced or significantly modified goods or services is higher than 20% of total
turnover9 (the full sample’s 75th percentile value); ‘Financial Constraints’ (the main vari-
able of interest) is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm reports that the lack of
finance (from either internal or external sources) is highly important in hampering its innova-
tion activities (in terms of leading to delay, abandonment or not starting innovation projects);
Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normally distributed random
variable; X is a vector of control variables; Y is a vector of instruments; ε1 and ε2 are the error
terms (assumed to be independently and identically distributed as bivariate normal); i, n, s,
c index firm, size group, industry and country. The control variables in Eq. (1) include the
traditional determinants of innovation used in innovation production functions (see Cre´pon
8Notice that the CIS provides limited information for the sample of firms not wishing to innovate, and thus,
estimating first the impact of financial constraints on the propensity to innovate (using a two stage approach)
is not possible.
9As a measure of the commercial success of innovation, this variable outperforms simple indicators coding
engagement in some kind of innovation activity (Mohnen & Ro¨ller, 2005; Mairesse & Mohnen, 2010).
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et al., 1998; Mohnen & Ro¨ller, 2005; Griffith et al., 2006; Lo¨o¨f & Heshmati, 2006; Mairesse &
Mohnen, 2010); that is, an indicator of whether the firm had some cooperative arrangements
on innovation activities during the surveyed period (‘Cooperation’), a categorical variable
reflecting different sources of information for innovation10 (‘External Search’), a measure of
the appropriability conditions that the firm faces (‘Formal Protection’), and indicators of
whether the firm engages in R&D (‘R&D’), has exporting activities (‘Export’), and is part
of an enterprise group (‘Group’). To capture unobserved heterogeneity, we also include size
(λn), industry (ηs) and country (ψc) fixed effects. Detailed variable definitions are given in
Table A.2. The cross correlation matrix for all regression variables is displayed in Table A.3.
We estimate Eqs. (1) and (2) by conditional recursive mixed process (cmp) estimators
using the procedure developed by Roodman (2009), which is suitable for a large family of
multi-equation systems where the dependent variable of each equation may have different
format (for example, binary, categorial, and bounded and unbounded continuous). This ap-
proach takes into account both simultaneity and endogeneity risks, and produces consistent
estimates for recursive systems in which all endogenous variable appear on the right-hand-side
as observed. Since our model is a recursive process (imposed by the instrumentation strategy),
consisting of one structural equation (‘Innovation Success’ equation) and one reduced-form
equation (‘Financial Constraints’ equation), the analysis is essentially a limited information
maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator. The advantage with this approach, as opposed to
two-stage least squares and related linear methods, is the gain in efficiency as it takes into
account the covariances of the errors and uses the information about the limited nature of the
reduced-form dependent variable (Anderson, 2005; Roodman, 2009). In the special case where
both dependent variables are binary (as above), the model is fundamentally a bivariate probit
model with endogenous dummy regressor11. The correlation coefficient ρ between ε1 and ε2
accounts for the possible existence of omitted or unobserved factors that affect simultaneously
the probability of successful innovation and the likelihood to face financial constraints.
The consistency of this method depends on the validity of instruments, which in turn, relies
on two conditions. First, the instruments must be determinants of facing financial constraints.
Second, they must not be correlated with the unobserved factors that may affect the propensity
to have high innovation performance. It is easy to show that the first condition is satisfied:
the estimated coefficients on the instruments must have the expected sign and be statistically
significant at conventional levels of significance in all models. To make sure that the second
condition is fulfilled, we propose using variables which affect the firm’s innovation performance
only through the financial constraints indicator. Industry-level proxies of financing structure
and economic performance appear to be good instruments, since they can influence the amount
of internal funds and the attractiveness of firms to external investors but cannot influence the
firm’s innovation performance directly. Hence, in addition to size (µn) specific effects, we focus
on four industry-level variables12. In particular, vector Y in Eq. (2) includes cross-country
10These include knowledge from within the enterprise group, from clients, suppliers, competitors, consultants,
universities, research institutions, conferences, professional associations and scientific journals.
11Bhattacharya et al. (2006) present simulations that suggest that bivariate probit is more robust than
instrumental variable techniques to non-normality of the error terms. Furthermore, Chiburis et al. (2011) show
that when treatment probabilities are low and when sample sizes are below 5000, the confidence intervals of
the instrumental variable estimates are too large for any meaningful hypothesis testing; in contrast, bivariate
probit confidence intervals are much smaller. Recursive bivariate probit models have previously been applied
in studies about the effects of financial constraints on the propensity to engage in R&D or to innovate: for
example, in Ma¨nnasoo & Meriku¨ll (2011) for transition economies, in Piga & Atzeni (2007) for Italy and in
Savignac (2008) for France.
12Since the conditional recursive mixed process estimator is a maximum likelihood estimator, it differs from
linear instrumental variable techniques in not necessarily including exogenous regressors (included instruments)
from the second stage in the first stage. However, as mentioned in Section 6, adding the variables ‘Cooperation’,
‘External Search’ and ‘Formal Protection’ to Eq. (2) yields very similar results.
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industry averages of ‘Public Support’, measured by the number of different types of sources
of public funding for innovation, ‘Collateral’, measured by the logarithm of tangible assets,
‘Financial Debt’, measured by the gearing ratio, and ‘Profitability’, measured by the operating
cash flow ratio13. Following the theoretical predictions, we expect that more profitable, less
public funding dependent industries are less likely to experience financial constraints (due to
larger amount of internal funds), whereas more risky industries and those with fewer realisable
assets are more likely to be financially constrained (due to more difficult access to external
funds). To test the validity of the aforementioned instruments, we perform the Sargan-Hansen
test for over-identifying restrictions in linear LIML models. Even though there is no theoretical
evidence to suggest that the assumptions necessary to perform this test are satisfied in the
bivariate probit with endogenous dummy regressor, previous empirical studies argue that this
is actually the best available diagnostic (Evans & Schwab, 1995; Yo¨ru¨k, 2009).
Notice that in order to ensure that the sample is representative of the relevant population
of firms in each country, all regressions are weighted by country sampling weights. These
weights correspond to the inverse of the probability of selection; that is, the total population
of firms divided by the total number of surveyed firms in each country.
5 Main Findings
We start by estimating Eq. (1) for the full sample of innovative firms using a univariate
probit model (see column (1) of Table 1). As a first point, we can notice that the traditional
determinants of innovation performance (included in vector X) have the expected positive sign
and are statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. Specifically, the results suggest that
cooperation, formal protection and engagement in R&D increase the probability of having
high innovation performance by 7%, 7% and 9% respectively. These estimates are similar
to those found in papers considering the Cre´pon et al. (1998)’s three-stage model or other
models on the innovation value chain in European countries (see OECD, 2009; Roper et al.,
2008). Consistent with the literature on “open innovation” (Chesbrough, 2003; Dahlander
& Gann, 2010; Love et al., 2011) and the causal effects of exporting (Salomon & Shaver,
2005; Damijan et al., 2008; Vahter, 2011), we also find that external knowledge sourcing
and export orientation play an important role: adding a new type of external knowledge
linkage and having exporting activities are both associated with 2% higher probability to be
in the group of most successful innovators. Turning now to our variable of interest (‘Financial
Constraints’), we can see that it has a surprising positive and highly statistically significant
impact on innovation performance. This lends support to the endogeneity argument and the
need for a two-equation model: ignoring the endogeneity of the financial constraints variable
may render the estimates of a univariate probit equation biased and inconsistent.
Column (2) of Table 1 presents the results of a bivariate probit estimation where the fi-
nancial constraints variable is instrumented using the specification of Eq. (2). The evidence
obtained validates the above statement: once the endogeneity bias is corrected, we find a neg-
ative (but statistically insignificant) relationship between financial constraints and innovation
performance while all other estimates remain virtually unchanged. Moreover, the Wald-test
of independent equations conclusively rejects the null hypothesis that the error terms are not
positively correlated, confirming the appropriateness of this approach. As pointed out in Sec-
tion 2, the impact of financial constraints is expected to be more pronounced for firms that do
not belong to an enterprise group and for firms that do not engage in exporting activities. To
13‘Collateral’, ‘Financial Debt’ and ‘Profitability’ are constructed using the cross-country 3-year average of
the corresponding firm-level variables based on Amadeus data for the periods 2002 to 2004 (for CIS4) and
2004 to 2006 (for CIS2006). To ensure that the industry-level measures are not sensitive to extreme values, all
firm-level variables are first winsorized at 1% and 99%.
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test these predictions, we re-estimate specification (2) for these two firm groups. The results,
displayed in columns (3) and (4), indicate stronger effects for non-exporters: the coefficient
on ‘Financial Constraints’ has the expected negative sign in both specifications, but appears
to be statistically significant in the non-exporters equation only. Qualitatively, the corre-
sponding estimate suggests that the likelihood to have high innovation performance is 16%
lower for non-exporters who face financial constraints. These findings do not seem to be just
a phenomenon of countries with relatively lower level of economic development. As shown
in columns (5)-(7), excluding the five Eastern European countries from our sample (namely,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania and Slovakia) yields very similar results, both
economically and statistically. It must be stressed that in all specifications of Table 1 (as well
as in those of the subsequent Tables), the instruments have the desirable properties; that is,
they are strong determinants of a firm’s financial barriers and are uncorrelated with the error
term of the innovation success equation (the p-value of the over-identifying restriction test is,
with the exception of column (5), above any standard significance level)14.
< Insert Table 1 here >
To investigate possible cross-sector heterogeneity of such causal effects, we partition the
full sample of innovative firms into production and services industries15 and re-estimate the
regression package of Table 1. Table 2 presents the results for production industries, while
Table 3 for services industries. Two regularities stand out. First, the causal effect of financial
constraints on innovation performance is stronger and statistically more robust in production
than in market services (see column (2) of Table 2 and Table 3). Second, within the two sectors
and particularly within the production sector, firms that do not belong to an enterprise group
and those that do not have exporting activities are more sensitive to financial constraints
(see columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 and Table 3). Specifically, in production, the estimated
reduction in the probability of having high innovation performance due to the presence of
financial constraints is quite large (21% for the full sample, 23% for the sub-sample of non-
group firms and 27% for the sub-sample of non-exporters) and is statistically significant in all
specifications. In contrast, in market services, the corresponding marginal effect is relatively
small (1% for the full sample, 5% for the sub-sample of non-group firms and 12% for the sub-
sample of non-exporters) and fails to reach statistical significance. Our results persist when
we restrict our analysis to include only the six Western European countries (see columns (5)-
(7) of Table 2 and Table 3). These sectoral variations are consistent with previous studies
documenting that services industries are less dependent on costly innovation inputs and more
capable of raising external and internal funds (Gallouj & Weinstein, 1997; Dahlstrand &
Cetindamar, 2000). This may be due to the fact that production firms have a higher efficiency
scale and face higher sunk costs compared to services firms (Silva & Carreira, 2010). It is
worth noting that the difference in the mean value of “share of sales with new products”
between production and market services is not statistically significant, implying that the
weaker response for services industries is not driven by a potentially lower propensity to
engage in product innovation (as opposed to other innovation activities, such as organizational
innovation).
< Insert Table 2 and Table 3 here >
14When we replace the industry-level public support variable with its firm-level counterpart, the Hansen-
Sargan test rejects the hypothesis that the instruments are correctly specified, confirming the validity of our
chosen instrument structure.
15Production industries include: manufacturing (2-digit NACE code D); mining and quarrying (C); electric-
ity, gas and water supply (E); construction (F). Market services industries include: wholesale and retail trade,
repair of motor vehicles, personal and household goods (G); hotels and restaurants (H); transport, storage and
communication (I); financial intermediation (J); real estate, renting and business activities (K).
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Are the reported findings sensitive to alternative definitions of the outcome variable? To
answer this question, we use as threshold for high innovation performance the value that
corresponds to the full samples’ median of “share of sales with new products”, instead of the
75% percentile, and re-run the regressions of Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3. Rows (1)-(3) of
Table 4 summarize the results on the financial constraints variable16 when we consider the
75% percentile as threshold value for coding highly innovative firms, while rows (4)-(6) when
we consider the median as alternative threshold value. Overall, re-coding the ‘Innovation
Success’ variable generates estimates which are similar to our baseline estimates (reported in
the previous two paragraphs) and leads to the same conclusions.
< Insert Table 4 here >
As mentioned in Section 2, information asymmetries and the intangible nature of assets
created by innovation projects increase the cost of external fund raising for such investments.
To this end, firms, first and foremost, use internal funds to finance innovation projects as
compared to external debt (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Bhattacharya & Ritter, 1983; Hall, 1990,
1992; Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994; Bougheas et al., 2003; Czarnitzki & Hottenrott, 2011).
This, in turn, implies that firms with limited internal funds are more likely to be constrained
in their innovation performance, as they may have to leave some of their innovation projects
on the shelf (Hottenrott & Peters, 2012). This conjecture is supported by our results: when we
re-define the ‘Financial Constraints’ variable to capture lack of finance from internal sources,
we find a monotonous increase in the responsiveness to financial constraints both in the full
sample of innovative firms and the sub-samples of production and market services (see rows
(7)-(9) of Table 4). Specifically, the estimated coefficients on ‘Financial Constraints’ and the
associated marginal effects appear to be larger in absolute value, compared to those in rows
(1)-(3), and to reach statistical significance also in the case of non-group firms (in the full
sample) and non-exporters (in the sample of services industries). The stronger response for
non-group firms probably reflects the fact that it is easier for firms that belong to an enter-
prise group to borrow funds internally; for example, from a mother company. As expected,
implementing the same tests using lack of finance from external sources as determinant of
financial constraints, produces weaker causal effects: the estimated coefficient on ‘Financial
Constraints’ is statistically significant only for non-exporters in production industries (see
rows (10)-(12)). Notice that the chosen instruments behave in the predicted way across these
new specifications; that is, ‘Profitability’ appears to be stronger determinant of internal finan-
cial constraints, whereas ‘Collateral’ and ‘Financial Debt’ appear to be stronger determinants
of external financial constraints.
6 Robustness Tests
As already stated, the conditional recursive mixed procedure (Roodman, 2009) works for a
large class of simultaneous-equation systems where the equations can have different kinds
of dependent variables. Thus, in order to further explore the sensitivity of our results to
the definition used for the outcome variable, we treat ‘Innovation Success’ as a continuous
variable and re-estimate Eqs. (1) and (2) following the same procedure. Even though using
the informational content of “share of sales with new products” may allow us to identify causal
effects on the intensity of innovation, shortcomings in the distribution and range limits of this
16For brevity and comparability, Table 4 and Table 5 display only the results on our variable of interest. The
estimated coefficients on the remaining control variables and instruments are very similar to those reported in
the baseline specifications and do not change the inferences drawn from earlier findings.
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variable17 point to its subjective nature and suggest that we should perhaps not draw too
strong conclusions based on its continuous variations (see also Mairesse & Mohnen, 2010).
Nevertheless, replacing the binary indicator with its continuous counterpart, does not change
significantly our key results (see rows (1)-(3) of Table 5). Once again, we find that production
industries exhibit significant sensitivity (both economic and statistical) to financial constraints
and that this sensitivity is relatively more pronounced in the sub-sample of non-exporters.
< Insert Table 5 here >
An important issue concerns the presence of the R&D variable in our model. Financial
constraints may affect the firm’s decision to engage in R&D, or the intensity with which the
firm undertakes R&D, and thus, including both variables among the determinants of innova-
tion success may pose collinearity threats. Although this problem is significantly mitigated by
focusing our analysis on the sample of innovative firms18, we do exclude ‘R&D’ from the set of
controls in Eq. (1) and test the robustness of our results. As shown in rows (4)-(6) of Table 5,
the corresponding estimated coefficients, p-values and marginal effects are remarkably simi-
lar to those of the baseline specifications. In another robustness check, we examine whether
our findings are sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of particular industries. Excluding the
non-manufacturing industries (utilities, mining and quarrying and construction) from the ag-
gregate production sector, leaves our results quantitatively and qualitatively unaffected (see
rows (7)-(9)). On the other hand, excluding the financial intermediation industries from the
aggregate services sector generates relatively stronger causal effects in this sector, especially
in the sub-sample of non-exporters (see rows (10)-(12)).
To explore the sensitivity of our results to different time samples, we replicate our empirical
analysis using pooled data from CIS4 and CIS2006; that is, we add data from CIS2006 for
eight out of the eleven CIS4 sampled countries. Despite the obvious problems with this
approach (such as, including firms that were surveyed in both waves), the results obtained
confirm our key findings: stronger response to financial constraints for production industries
and more pronounced effects for firms with no exporting activities (see rows (13)-(15) of
Table 5). Finally, we experiment with different instruments. Specifically, we examine how our
results change when we exclude the variable ‘Public Support’ from Eq. (2), and when we add
the variables ‘Cooperation’, ‘External Search’ and ‘Formal Protection’ to Eq. (2). Overall,
estimates based on these alternative sets of instruments (available upon request) are similar
to our baseline estimates.
7 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature in two main aspects. First, we use data from 40,000
innovative firms in both Western and Eastern European countries and provide evidence that a
binding financial constraint is strongly negatively related to innovation performance. The es-
timates suggest that innovative firms facing financial constraints, especially those with limited
internal funds, have 15-20% lower probability to be in the group of most successful innovators.
Second, we show that the responsiveness to such constraints differs between production and
services sectors, and also by the firm’s export status. Specifically, we find that: (i) innovative
17In particular, this variable: (i) has values that tend to be rounded (for example, 10%, 15%, 20%); (ii) has
a highly skewed distribution with a large mass of firms reporting zero innovative sales; (iii) may be plagued by
outliers, as some countries have a surprisingly large number of firms reporting a high percentage of innovative
sales (even 100%). Notice that the normality assumption is rejected even we we exclude the 0% and 100%
shares of innovative sales.
18The correlation coefficient between ‘Financial Constraints’ and ‘R&D’ falls from 0.27 to 0.09 when we
consider the sample of innovative firms.
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firms in production industries are significantly and robustly more sensitive to financial fric-
tions than those in services industries; (ii) within sectors, financial frictions are particularly
detrimental for innovative firms with no exporting activities.
From a policy point of view, our results emphasize the role of financial constraints as one
of the principal driving forces behind low innovation performance for a significant portion of
firms. Therefore, policies aiming at enhancing access to external finance19 can have a strong
positive impact on innovation intensity in firms with limited internal funds, which may lead
to a more rapid development of new goods and services, and higher economic growth. Policy
initiatives can also involve improving information systems and strengthening investor pro-
tection to alleviate information asymmetries between lenders and firms, as well as providing
fiscal incentives (such as R&D tax incentives) and funding support for innovation-related col-
laboration across firms and between firms and technological institutions. The finding that
the importance of financial constraints varies with firm characteristics points also to another
conclusion: for any innovation policy program to be effective it is vital not to rely on uni-
form R&D and innovation support measures, but to provide programs that support different
firms in different ways. Policies aimed especially at the most constrained firms (for exam-
ple, non-exporters) are likely to yield the strongest benefits. On the other hand, the finding
that innovation sensitivity to financial frictions varies across sectors contributes to a better
understanding of sectoral heterogeneities, and provides micro-foundations for interpretation
of different effects on productivity and economic growth. In particular, financial frictions
affecting more strongly innovation performance in production industries (compared to ser-
vices industries) can account for possible productivity gaps between the two sectors and be
seen as one of the factors that cause different responses to financial crises (see Efthyvoulou,
2012). Hence, establishing better mechanisms of how the occurrence of financial crises af-
fects firm-level and sectoral-level innovation performance (for instance, using data from the
most recent waves of the CIS that cover the post-2007 period) is an important task for future
research. According to Brandes (2008), the glory time for manufacturing as steering engine
for Europe’s economy and provider of massive employment is over, and the structural change
towards services is likely to continue over the next decades. Thus, alleviating the adverse
effects of financial frictions on innovation performance can have a substantial impact on slow-
ing down the relative decline of manufacturing in Europe - which is a key policy goal for EU
policymakers.
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A Appendix
A.1 Community Innovation Surveys
◮ We consider that a firm had innovation activities during the surveyed period if it an-
swered positively to at least one of the following: (1) introduced new or significantly
improved products (good or services) with respect to its capabilities, such as improved
software, user friendliness, components or sub-systems; (2) introduced new or signif-
icantly improved process, distribution, method, or support activity for its goods or
services; (3) had any ongoing innovation activities; (4) faced obstacles to innovation (se-
riously delayed, prevented to be started, or abandoned innovation projects or activities).
◮ The key question about financial constraints to innovation is the following: “During the
surveyed period, how important were the following factors for hampering your innovation
activities or projects or influencing a decision not to innovate?”. We focus on two
factors: lack of funds within the enterprise group (internal financial constraints); lack of
funds from outside the enterprise (external financial constraints). The answer choices
are: (a) factor of high importance; (b) factor of medium importance; (c) factor of low
importance; (d) factor not experienced. We consider a firm to be financially constrained
if it answered that the lack of finance (either from internal of external sources) was
highly important in hampering its innovation activities or projects (in terms of leading
to delay, abandonment or not starting innovation projects); that is, answer (a).
A.2 Tables
Table A.1: Statistics for CIS4 firms
All Countries (11) Western Countries (6)
Number of firms 121806 73004
Number of innovative firms 39939 29513
Report impacta on innovation activities 18252 (45.7%) 13167 (44.6%)
Due to lack of internal/external finance 6595 (16.5%) 4572 (15.5%)
a Impact refers to serious delay, abandonment or not starting innovation projects. The sample of
Western European countries includes France, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, whereas
the sample of Eastern European countries includes Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania and
Slovakia.
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Table A.2: Description of variables for innovative firms
Variable Name Definition Mean Std. Dev.
Innovation Success 0-1 dummy variable, =1 if the turnover from newly intro-
duced or significantly modified goods or services (“share
of sales with new products”) is higher than 20% of total
turnover (the full sample’s 75th percentile value)
0.25 0.43
Financial Constraints 0-1 dummy variable, =1 if the firm reports that the lack of
finance (from either internal or external sources) is highly
important in hampering its innovation activities
0.17 0.37
Cooperation 0-1 dummy variable, =1 if the firm has some cooperative
arrangements on innovation activities
0.33 0.47
External Search number of highly important sources of knowledge or infor-
mation for innovation (ranges from 0 to 10)
1.47 1.51
Formal Protection 0-1 dummy variable, =1 if the firm uses design pattern,
trademarks, or copyright to protect inventions or innovations
0.33 0.47
R&D 0-1 dummy variable, =1 if the firm reports engagement in
R&D activities
0.62 0.49
Export 0-1 dummy variable, =1 if the firm sells goods or services in
other countries
0.55 0.50
Group 0-1 dummy variable, =1 if the firm is part of a firm group
(two or more legally-defined firms under common ownership)
0.42 0.49
Public Support number of sources of public financial support for innovation
(ranges from 0 to 3: local, national, EU); industry-level av-
erage
0.13 0.08
Collateral = log(tangible assets); industry-level average 6.67 0.85
Financial Debt = ((non current liabilities+loans)/shareholders funds)∗100;
industry-level average
104.77 41.18
Profitability = (cash flow/operating revenue)∗100; industry-level average 6.86 5.55
Size Dummies set of size dummies according to the firm’s number of em-
ployees (categories are <20, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-999,
>1000)
Industry Dummies set of industry dummies according to the firm’s main busi-
ness activities (NACE 2-digit level)
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Table A.3: Cross correlation matrix for regression variables
Innovation Financial Cooperation External Formal R&D Export Group Public Collateral Financial Profitab.
Success Constraints Search Protection Support Debt
Innovation Success 1.00
Financial Constraints 0.06 1.00
Cooperation 0.08 0.07 1.00
External Search 0.12 0.07 0.15 1.00
Formal Protection 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.14 1.00
R&D 0.05 0.09 0.26 0.10 0.24 1.00
Export 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.21 0.23 1.00
Group -0.05 -0.05 0.22 0.01 0.18 0.20 0.19 1.00
Public Support 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.25 0.22 0.05 1.00
Collateral -0.05 -0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.19 1.00
Financial Debt -0.08 -0.03 -0.17 -0.10 -0.10 -0.04 -0.09 -0.10 -0.24 0.29 1.00
Profitability -0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.10 0.08 -0.16 0.02 0.01 1.00
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Table 1: Bivariate probit model: all industries
Probit Bivariate probit - All Countries Bivariate probit - Western Countries
All All Firms Non-Group Non-Exporters All Non-Group Non-Exporters
Coef. Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Equation for innovation success
Financial Constraints 0.06*** -0.42 -0.13 -0.40 -0.13 -0.62** -0.16 -0.30 -0.08 -0.12 -0.03 -0.91** -0.18
(0.00) (0.18) (0.43) (0.02) (0.57) (0.88) (0.05)
Cooperation 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.07 0.22*** 0.08 0.20*** 0.06 0.20*** 0.06 0.22*** 0.07 0.21*** 0.06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
External Search 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.05*** 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Formal Protection 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.07 0.17*** 0.06 0.22*** 0.07 0.21*** 0.07 0.17*** 0.05 0.19*** 0.06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R&D 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.09 0.27*** 0.09 0.20*** 0.06 0.26*** 0.07 0.26*** 0.08 0.17*** 0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exports 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.02 0.11*** 0.04 0.07*** 0.02 0.11*** 0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Group 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.06** 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.07** 0.02
(0.21) (0.23) (0.03) (0.32) (0.03)
Size Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Equation for financial constraints
Public Support 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.15***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Collateral -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.12*** -0.08***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Financial Debt 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.13***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Profitability -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.04** -0.06***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
Size Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Error Correlation Testa 2.06* 0.73 5.81*** 0.43 0.05 2.35*
[0.08] [0.20] [0.00] [0.26] [0.41] [0.06]
Over-identification Testb 5.90 4.62 1.71 6.89* 4.46 2.84
[0.12] [0.20] [0.42] [0.08] [0.22] [0.42]
Number of Firms 39939 39939 23112 18084 29513 15461 12709
Columns report estimated coefficients and associated marginal effects (evaluated at mean values). Robust p-values in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by country sampling
weights. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. a Reports the Wald test statistic [p-value], where H0: ρ ≤ 0. b Reports the
Sargan-Hansen test statistic [p-value], where H0: over-identifying restrictions are valid. The Sargan-Hansen test is implemented in linear LIML models. The variables in the financial
constraints equation are taken in their standard normalised form with zero mean and standard deviation one.
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Table 2: Bivariate probit model: production industries
Probit Bivariate probit - All Countries Bivariate probit - Western Countries
All All Firms Non-Group Non-Exporters All Non-Group Non-Exporters
Coef. Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Equation for innovation success
Financial Constraints 0.04 -0.74*** -0.21 -0.81** -0.23 -1.19*** -0.27 -0.94*** -0.22 -1.12*** -0.26 -1.42*** -0.26
(0.12) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05)
Cooperation 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.06 0.21*** 0.07 0.13*** 0.04 0.16*** 0.05 0.20*** 0.06 0.12*** 0.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
External Search 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.05*** 0.02 0.05*** 0.02 0.05*** 0.02 0.03*** 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Formal Protection 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.07 0.15*** 0.05 0.25*** 0.08 0.20*** 0.06 0.13*** 0.04 0.16*** 0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R&D 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.10 0.29*** 0.10 0.19*** 0.06 0.27*** 0.08 0.26*** 0.08 0.15*** 0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exports 0.06** 0.06** 0.02 0.10*** 0.03 0.05* 0.02 0.09*** 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00)
Group 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.37) (0.40) (0.20) (0.79) (0.48)
Size Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Equation for financial constraints
Public Support 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Collateral -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.04** -0.02 -0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.45) (0.51)
Financial Debt 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.16***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Profitability -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.17*** -0.25*** -0.15***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Size Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Error Correlation Testa 5.94*** 4.10** 3.06** 5.14** 7.55*** 27.04***
[0.00] [0.02] [0.04] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
Over-identification Testb 3.82 0.27 1.27 7.97** 0.49 5.04
[0.28] [0.87] [0.74] [0.04] [0.92] [0.17]
Number of Firms 25373 25373 15216 9149 18241 9918 6044
See notes for Table 1
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Table 3: Bivariate probit model: services industries
Probit Bivariate probit - All Countries Bivariate probit - Western Countries
All All Firms Non-Group Non-Exporters All Non-Group Non-Exporters
Coef. Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Equation for innovation success
Financial Constraints 0.08** -0.01 -0.01 -0.16 -0.05 -0.43 -0.12 0.25 0.08 -0.07 -0.02 -0.41 -0.10
(0.03) (0.98) (0.74) (0.12) (0.49) (0.91) (0.28)
Cooperation 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.08 0.23*** 0.07 0.24*** 0.08 0.25*** 0.08 0.23*** 0.07 0.26*** 0.08
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
External Search 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.05*** 0.02 0.05*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Formal Protection 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.07 0.20*** 0.07 0.18*** 0.06 0.22*** 0.06 0.20*** 0.06 0.18*** 0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R&D 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.07 0.22*** 0.08 0.19*** 0.06 0.23*** 0.07 0.21*** 0.06 0.17*** 0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exports 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.04 0.09*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Group 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.06* 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.08* 0.02
(0.33) (0.33) (0.09) (0.23) (0.48)
Size Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Equation for financial constraints
Public Support 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.18***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Collateral -0.07*** -0.17*** -0.11*** 0.03 -0.10** -0.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.90) (0.02) (0.25)
Financial Debt 0.05*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.08***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00)
Profitability -0.05*** -0.04* -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.03 -0.05***
(0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00)
Size Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Error Correlation Testa 0.07 0.24 3.26** 0.20 0.08 1.68*
[0.39] [0.31] [0.04] [0.67] [0.39] [0.09]
Over-identification Testb 0.25 0.51 0.00 7.80* 2.38 3.22
[0.88] [0.77] [0.99] [0.05] [0.30] [0.20]
Number of Firms 14566 14566 7896 8935 11272 5543 6665
See notes for Table 1
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Table 4: Summary of results on the financial constraints variable
Threshold for ‘Innovation Success’: the full sample’s 75th percentile of “share of sales with new
products”; ‘Financial Constraints’: lack of finance from either internal or external sources
Sample Coefficient P > |z| dy/dx No of firms
(1) All Industries All Firms -0.42 0.18 -0.13 39939
Non-Group -0.40 0.43 -0.13 23112
Non-Exporters -0.62** 0.02 -0.16 18084
(2) Production Industries All Firms -0.74*** 0.00 -0.21 25373
Non-Group -0.81** 0.02 -0.23 15216
Non-Exporters -1.19*** 0.00 -0.27 9149
(3) Services Industries All Firms -0.01 0.98 -0.01 14566
Non-Group -0.16 0.74 -0.05 7896
Non-Exporters -0.43 0.12 -0.12 8935
Threshold for ‘Innovation Success’: the full sample’s 50th percentile (median) of “share of sales
with new products”; ‘Financial Constraints’: lack of finance from either internal or external
sources
Sample Coefficient P > |z| dy/dx No of firms
(4) All Industries All Firms -0.23 0.39 -0.09 39939
Non-Group -0.26 0.67 -0.10 23112
Non-Exporters -0.36 0.14 -0.14 18084
(5) Production Industries All Firms -0.60*** 0.00 -0.23 25373
Non-Group -0.63* 0.05 -0.25 15216
Non-Exporters -0.69** 0.02 -0.25 9149
(6) Services Industries All Firms 0.17 0.65 0.07 14566
Non-Group -0.05 0.93 -0.02 7896
Non-Exporters -0.17 0.55 -0.07 8935
Threshold for ‘Innovation Success’: the full sample’s 75th percentile of “share of sales with new
products”; ‘Financial Constraints’: lack of finance from internal sources
Sample Coefficient P > |z| dy/dx No of firms
(7) All Industries All Firms -0.50 0.14 -0.14 39939
Non-Group -0.94*** 0.00 -0.25 23112
Non-Exporters -0.82*** 0.00 -0.20 18084
(8) Production Industries All Firms -0.92*** 0.00 -0.24 25373
Non-Group -1.14*** 0.00 -0.29 15216
Non-Exporters -1.27*** 0.00 -0.27 9149
(9) Services Industries All Firms -0.11 0.77 -0.03 14566
Non-Group -0.53 0.20 -0.16 7896
Non-Exporters -0.63** 0.03 -0.16 8935
Threshold for ‘Innovation Success’: the full sample’s 75th percentile of “share of sales with new
products”; ‘Financial Constraints’: lack of finance from external sources
Sample Coefficient P > |z| dy/dx No of firms
(10) All Industries All Firms -0.46 0.15 -0.13 39939
Non-Group 0.07 0.85 0.03 23112
Non-Exporters -0.50 0.17 -0.13 18084
(11) Production Industries All Firms -0.50 0.11 -0.15 25373
Non-Group -0.09 0.85 -0.03 15216
Non-Exporters -0.97** 0.02 -0.22 9149
(12) Services Industries All Firms 0.16 0.71 0.05 14566
Non-Group 0.22 0.64 0.08 7896
Non-Exporters -0.07 0.85 -0.02 8935
Columns report estimated coefficients, robust p-values and associated marginal effects (evaluated at
mean values). ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively.
Financial Constraints, Innovation Performance and Sectoral Disaggregation 20
Table 5: Robustness tests
Treat ‘Innovation Success’ as continuous
Sample Coefficient P > |z| No of firms
(1) All Industries All Firms 0.01 0.98 39939
Non-Group 0.01 0.90 23112
Non-Exporters -0.04 0.39 18084
(2) Production Industries All Firms -0.08** 0.04 25373
Non-Group -0.06 0.28 15216
Non-Exporters -0.10* 0.07 9149
(3) Services Industries All Firms 0.15 0.37 14566
Non-Group 0.05 0.59 7896
Non-Exporters 0.01 0.93 8935
Exclude ‘R&D’ from the list of controls
Sample Coefficient P > |z| dy/dx No of firms
(4) All Industries All Firms -0.38 0.20 -0.12 39939
Non-Group -0.33 0.39 -0.11 23112
Non-Exporters -0.62** 0.02 -0.16 18084
(5) Production Industries All Firms -0.64** 0.02 -0.18 25373
Non-Group -0.72** 0.03 -0.21 15216
Non-Exporters -1.04*** 0.00 -0.25 9149
(6) Services Industries All Firms -0.01 0.99 -0.01 14566
Non-Group -0.13 0.75 -0.04 7896
Non-Exporters -0.44 0.13 -0.12 8935
Exclude non-manufacturing industries from the aggregate production sector
Sample Coefficient P > |z| dy/dx No of firms
(7) All Industries All Firms -0.41 0.27 -0.13 37046
Non-Group -0.44 0.47 -0.15 21319
Non-Exporters -0.61** 0.03 -0.17 15698
(8) Production Industries All Firms -0.69* 0.09 -0.21 22480
Non-Group -0.89** 0.02 -0.26 13423
Non-Exporters -1.07*** 0.00 -0.28 6763
(9) Services Industries All Firms -0.01 0.98 -0.01 14566
Non-Group -0.16 0.74 -0.05 7896
Non-Exporters -0.43 0.12 -0.12 8935
Exclude financial intermediation industries from the aggregate services sector
Sample Coefficient P > |z| dy/dx No of firms
(10) All Industries All Firms -0.88*** 0.00 -0.24 38482
Non-Group -0.72* 0.08 -0.21 22636
Non-Exporters -1.07*** 0.00 -0.26 16884
(11) Production Industries All Firms -0.74*** 0.00 -0.21 25373
Non-Group -0.81** 0.02 -0.23 15216
Non-Exporters -1.19*** 0.00 -0.27 9149
(12) Services Industries All Firms 0.34 0.56 0.12 13109
Non-Group -0.19 0.79 -0.07 7420
Non-Exporters -0.83** 0.03 -0.21 7735
Add data from CIS2006 for eight countries
Sample Coefficient P > |z| dy/dx No of firms
(13) All Industries All Firms -0.30 0.21 -0.10 55526
Non-Group -0.09 0.86 -0.03 32712
Non-Exporters -0.47* 0.06 -0.14 25432
(14) Production Industries All Firms -0.43* 0.09 -0.14 35433
Non-Group -0.50 0.39 -0.16 21514
Non-Exporters -1.00*** 0.00 -0.26 13100
(15) Services Industries All Firms 0.04 0.89 0.01 20093
Non-Group 0.02 0.96 0.01 11198
Non-Exporters -0.24 0.36 -0.07 12332
See notes for Table 4
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